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+## Configuration file for a typical Tor user
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+## Last updated 22 September 2015 for Tor 0.2.7.3-alpha.
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+## (may or may not work for much older or much newer versions of Tor.)
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+##
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+## Lines that begin with "## " try to explain what's going on. Lines
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+## that begin with just "#" are disabled commands: you can enable them
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+## by removing the "#" symbol.
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+##
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+## See 'man tor', or https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html,
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+## for more options you can use in this file.
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+##
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+## Tor will look for this file in various places based on your platform:
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+## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#torrc
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+
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+## Tor opens a SOCKS proxy on port 9050 by default -- even if you don't
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+## configure one below. Set "SOCKSPort 0" if you plan to run Tor only
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+## as a relay, and not make any local application connections yourself.
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+#SOCKSPort 9050 # Default: Bind to localhost:9050 for local connections.
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+#SOCKSPort 192.168.0.1:9100 # Bind to this address:port too.
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+
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+## Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address.
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+## First entry that matches wins. If no SOCKSPolicy is set, we accept
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+## all (and only) requests that reach a SOCKSPort. Untrusted users who
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+## can access your SOCKSPort may be able to learn about the connections
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+## you make.
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+#SOCKSPolicy accept 192.168.0.0/16
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+#SOCKSPolicy accept6 FC00::/7
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+#SOCKSPolicy reject *
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+
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+
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+## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something
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+## else, like one of the below lines. You can have as many Log lines as
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+## you want.
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+##
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+## We advise using "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose
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+## may provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the logs.
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+##
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+## Send all messages of level 'notice' or higher to /var/log/tor/notices.log
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+#Log notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log
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+## Send every possible message to /var/log/tor/debug.log
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+#Log debug file /var/log/tor/debug.log
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+## Use the system log instead of Tor's logfiles
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+#Log notice syslog
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+## To send all messages to stderr:
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+#Log debug stderr
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+
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+## Uncomment this to start the process in the background... or use
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+## --runasdaemon 1 on the command line. This is ignored on Windows;
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+## see the FAQ entry if you want Tor to run as an NT service.
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+#RunAsDaemon 1
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+
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+## The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store
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+## things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows.
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+DataDirectory /app/data/etc/settings
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+
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+## The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor
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+## controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt.
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+#ControlPort 9051
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+## If you enable the controlport, be sure to enable one of these
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+## authentication methods, to prevent attackers from accessing it.
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+#HashedControlPassword 16:872860B76453A77D60CA2BB8C1A7042072093276A3D701AD684053EC4C
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+#CookieAuthentication 1
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+
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+############### This section is just for location-hidden services ###
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+
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+## Once you have configured a hidden service, you can look at the
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+## contents of the file ".../hidden_service/hostname" for the address
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+## to tell people.
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+##
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+## HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect requests on port x to the
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+## address y:z.
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+
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+
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+HiddenServiceDir /app/data/etc/torsite/
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+HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:3000
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+
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+
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+#HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/other_hidden_service/
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+#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
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+#HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22
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+
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+################ This section is just for relays #####################
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+#
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+## See https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay for details.
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+
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+## Required: what port to advertise for incoming Tor connections.
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+#ORPort 9001
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+## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
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+## ORPort (e.g. to advertise 443 but bind to 9090), you can do it as
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+## follows. You'll need to do ipchains or other port forwarding
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+## yourself to make this work.
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+#ORPort 443 NoListen
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+#ORPort 127.0.0.1:9090 NoAdvertise
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+
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+## The IP address or full DNS name for incoming connections to your
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+## relay. Leave commented out and Tor will guess.
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+#Address noname.example.com
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+
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+## If you have multiple network interfaces, you can specify one for
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+## outgoing traffic to use.
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+# OutboundBindAddress 10.0.0.5
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+
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+## A handle for your relay, so people don't have to refer to it by key.
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+## Nicknames must be between 1 and 19 characters inclusive, and must
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+## contain only the characters [a-zA-Z0-9].
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+#Nickname ididnteditheconfig
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+
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+## Define these to limit how much relayed traffic you will allow. Your
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+## own traffic is still unthrottled. Note that RelayBandwidthRate must
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+## be at least 75 kilobytes per second.
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+## Note that units for these config options are bytes (per second), not
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+## bits (per second), and that prefixes are binary prefixes, i.e. 2^10,
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+## 2^20, etc.
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+#RelayBandwidthRate 100 KBytes # Throttle traffic to 100KB/s (800Kbps)
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+#RelayBandwidthBurst 200 KBytes # But allow bursts up to 200KB (1600Kb)
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+
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+## Use these to restrict the maximum traffic per day, week, or month.
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+## Note that this threshold applies separately to sent and received bytes,
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+## not to their sum: setting "40 GB" may allow up to 80 GB total before
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+## hibernating.
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+##
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+## Set a maximum of 40 gigabytes each way per period.
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+#AccountingMax 40 GBytes
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+## Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day)
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+#AccountingStart day 00:00
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+## Each period starts on the 3rd of the month at 15:00 (AccountingMax
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+## is per month)
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+#AccountingStart month 3 15:00
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+
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+## Administrative contact information for this relay or bridge. This line
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+## can be used to contact you if your relay or bridge is misconfigured or
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+## something else goes wrong. Note that we archive and publish all
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+## descriptors containing these lines and that Google indexes them, so
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+## spammers might also collect them. You may want to obscure the fact that
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+## it's an email address and/or generate a new address for this purpose.
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+#ContactInfo Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>
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+## You might also include your PGP or GPG fingerprint if you have one:
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+#ContactInfo 0xFFFFFFFF Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>
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+
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+## Uncomment this to mirror directory information for others. Please do
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+## if you have enough bandwidth.
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+#DirPort 9030 # what port to advertise for directory connections
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+## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
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+## DirPort (e.g. to advertise 80 but bind to 9091), you can do it as
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+## follows. below too. You'll need to do ipchains or other port
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+## forwarding yourself to make this work.
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+#DirPort 80 NoListen
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+#DirPort 127.0.0.1:9091 NoAdvertise
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+## Uncomment to return an arbitrary blob of html on your DirPort. Now you
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+## can explain what Tor is if anybody wonders why your IP address is
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+## contacting them. See contrib/tor-exit-notice.html in Tor's source
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+## distribution for a sample.
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+#DirPortFrontPage /etc/tor/tor-exit-notice.html
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+
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+## Uncomment this if you run more than one Tor relay, and add the identity
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+## key fingerprint of each Tor relay you control, even if they're on
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+## different networks. You declare it here so Tor clients can avoid
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+## using more than one of your relays in a single circuit. See
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+## https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#MultipleRelays
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+## However, you should never include a bridge's fingerprint here, as it would
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+## break its concealability and potentially reveal its IP/TCP address.
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+#MyFamily $keyid,$keyid,...
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+
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+## A comma-separated list of exit policies. They're considered first
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+## to last, and the first match wins.
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+##
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+## If you want to allow the same ports on IPv4 and IPv6, write your rules
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+## using accept/reject *. If you want to allow different ports on IPv4 and
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+## IPv6, write your IPv6 rules using accept6/reject6 *6, and your IPv4 rules
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+## using accept/reject *4.
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+##
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+## If you want to _replace_ the default exit policy, end this with either a
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+## reject *:* or an accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending to)
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+## the default exit policy. Leave commented to just use the default, which is
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+## described in the man page or at
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+## https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html
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+##
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+## Look at https://www.torproject.org/faq-abuse.html#TypicalAbuses
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+## for issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy.
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+##
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+## If certain IPs and ports are blocked externally, e.g. by your firewall,
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+## you should update your exit policy to reflect this -- otherwise Tor
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+## users will be told that those destinations are down.
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+##
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+## For security, by default Tor rejects connections to private (local)
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+## networks, including to the configured primary public IPv4 and IPv6 addresses,
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+## and any public IPv4 and IPv6 addresses on any interface on the relay.
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+## See the man page entry for ExitPolicyRejectPrivate if you want to allow
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+## "exit enclaving".
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+##
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+#ExitPolicy accept *:6660-6667,reject *:* # allow irc ports on IPv4 and IPv6 but no more
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+#ExitPolicy accept *:119 # accept nntp ports on IPv4 and IPv6 as well as default exit policy
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+#ExitPolicy accept *4:119 # accept nntp ports on IPv4 only as well as default exit policy
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+#ExitPolicy accept6 *6:119 # accept nntp ports on IPv6 only as well as default exit policy
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+#ExitPolicy reject *:* # no exits allowed
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+
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+## Bridge relays (or "bridges") are Tor relays that aren't listed in the
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+## main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them, even an
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+## ISP that filters connections to all the known Tor relays probably
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+## won't be able to block all the bridges. Also, websites won't treat you
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+## differently because they won't know you're running Tor. If you can
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+## be a real relay, please do; but if not, be a bridge!
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+#BridgeRelay 1
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+## By default, Tor will advertise your bridge to users through various
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+## mechanisms like https://bridges.torproject.org/. If you want to run
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+## a private bridge, for example because you'll give out your bridge
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+## address manually to your friends, uncomment this line:
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+#PublishServerDescriptor 0
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+
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